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Introduction
The public housing program has been run by Local Housing Au-
thorities (LHA's) since the program began in 1937.1 When construct-
ing new units LHA's float tax-free bonds, guaranteed and subsidized
by the federal government.2 Ongoing operating costs were, until 1969,
generally satisfied by rental revenues without financial assistance from
the federal government. 3 During 1969, Congress dramatically altered
the system of federal obligations and subsidies for LHA's in two ways:
it passed the Brooke Amendment limiting a tenant's rent in public
housing to twenty-five percent of a tenant's income;4 at the same time,
Congress authorized federal funds for the ongoing operating deficits
as well as the construction debts in LHA's.5
The new system for financing public housing is now in shambles.
The limitation on tenant rentals, combined with rising operating costs,
has caused LHA's to run large operating deficits.0 However, Congress
* The author wishes to thank for helpful comments and information: Professor
Arthur Leff of Yale Law School, Attorney Stuart Bear of New Haven Legal Aid, and
Attorney Daniel Sachs of the New Haven Housing Authority.
** A.B. Harvard University, 1968; J.D. Yale Law School, 1972; Research Fellow,
Yale Law School.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-36 (Supp. 1973).
2. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) makes annual con-
tributions covering the repayment of interest and principal on LHA bonds. See NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN LAW AND POVERTY, HANDBOOK ON HOUSING LAW,
ch. IV, Pt. II, at 5-9 (1971).
3. HUD limited annual contributions generally to capital costs. HANDBOOK ON HOtS-
ING LAW, supra note 2, at 9. However, special operating subsidies were authorized to pro.
vide housing for the elderly, large families, certain displaced families, or families of
unusually low incomes. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970).
4. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 213(a), 83 Stat.
389, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. I, 1971)).
5. Id. § 212(a). This act increased HUD's contract authorization by $75 million and
earmarked it for operating subsidies. H.R. REP. No. 91-470, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 30.32
(1969).
6. For example, the LHA in Portland, Oregon, has lost thirty percent of its rental
revenues since the Brooke Amendments, and has had an operating deficit of $610,000
per year. King, Cities Losing on Aid for Housing Poor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1972, at 17,
cols. 2-3.
Figures for operating deficits incurred by LHA's used in this article are from the New
York Times and the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials
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has not appropriated enough funds specifically to meet these deficits,7
and the executive branch has refused to satisfy the need from other
eligible appropriations.8 As a result, many LHA's face imminent
bankruptcy.9
The current fiscal crisis in public housing has important implica-
tions for an increasing number of public corporations10 which, like
LHA's,11 exist as legal hybrids between government agencies and pri-
vate companies. Similar public corporations may be chartered by the
state, e.g., the New York Port Authority,12 or by the federal govern-
ment, e.g., the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).' 3 In contrast to
government agencies, these public corporations are distinct legal en-
tities without sovereign immunity.' 4 They maintain their own treas-
(NAHRO). Efforts to obtain HUD figures on aggregate deficits claimed by LHA's were
unsuccessful, either because HUD does not compute such figures or does not release them
to the public.
7. Congressional appropriations earmarked for operating subsidies were below the
estimated need for such subsidies by $19.6 million in fiscal 1970, $92 million in fiscal
1971, $103 million in fiscal 1972, and $155.4 million in fiscal 1973. Compare col. (5) with
col. (9) in the Chart of App., infra.
8. The line item appropriation for operating subsidies is under the general heading
of "Low-rent public housing" in the United States Budget, which includes other line
items such as new construction for public housing. HUD officials felt free to juggle funds
among line items in fiscal 1972 and fiscal 1973. See col. (7), Chart of App. infra. But
the funds reallocated by HUD together with the earmarked appropriations for operating
subsidies still fell short of LHA operating deficits by $82 million in fiscal 1971. ,43
million in fiscal 1972, and $55 million in fiscal 1973. Compare col. (8) with col. (9) in
Chart of App., infra.
9. The Public Housing Financial Crisis: Cause and Effect, NAHRO Bulletin, Sept.
29, 1972.
10. For a general discussion of public corporations in America, see Abel, The Public
Corporation in the United States, in GovEraNETr EN RaRIusE 181 (W. Friedmann & J.
Garner eds. 1970).
The fiscal crisis for LHA's may also have implications for non.profit corporations,
a topic beyond the scope of this article. However, non-profit corporations may be dis.
tinguished from quasi-public corporations on legal and policy grounds. Most non.profit
corporations are registered under a general state incorporation act or a general non-
profit incorporation act, as opposed to a special act of the legislature. H. Otcs. NON-
PROFIT CORPORATIONS AND AssocIATioNs 127-44 (1956). Non-profit corporations are typically
run by boards elected by members or trustees rather than appointed by state or federal
governments. Id. at 270-71.
Moreover, the policy reasons for non-profit corporations are mainly the promotion of
pluralistic "giving" and neighborhood control, in contrast to the key policy goal of
business-type management in quasi-public corporations. For a discussion of the policy
questions for non-profit corporations in the housing field, see P. NERNcK & J. PorE,
RESIDENTIAL REHABILITATION: THE PITFALLs OF NoN-PROFrr SPoNsopiulnr ch. 10 (19653).
11. This article will employ as a paradigm corporate charter for LHA's the legislation
on local housing authorities in Wisconsin. Wisc. STAT. ANN. .§ 66.40-66.4G4 (1965).
12. See generally N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6401-7154 (McKinney 1961).
13. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 831-831d(d) (1970).
14. A LHA is "a public body corporate and politic," Wtsc. STAT. ANN. 66A0(4)(a)
(1965), which can sue and be sued in its own name. Wise. STAT. ANN. § 66A0(9)(n)
(1965). The New York Port Authority is "a body corporate and politic," N.Y. Uicossot..
LAws § 6404 (McKinney 1961), against which the state consents to suits. N.Y. UNcoNsoL.
LAws § 7101 (McKinney 1961). The TVA is "a body corporate," 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1970),
which can sue and be sued. 16 U.S.C. § 831c(b) (1970).
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uries and hold property in their own names."; Their board members
are usually non-partisan appointees, outside the civil service regula-
tions, with significant protection against removal.10 In contrast to pri-
vate companies, these public corporations are established by special
legislative act and are operated by boards appointed by a governmental
official. 7 Government appropriations provide initial capital to these
corporations, though they also float bonds.18 They usually make pay-
ments in lieu of taxes and send annual reports to the chartering gov-
ernmental body.'9
Because public corporations are legal hybrids, the legal status of
their financial agreements with any government body is problematic.
Private companies bargain at arm's-length over contracts which are
binding on the government,20 while government agencies have no
"enforceable" agreements with each other or the chief executive.2'
But public corporations, such as LHA's, are in the middle-heavily
dependent on government subsidies, but intended to operate as in-
dependent legal entities. 22
Government officials are currently attempting to treat certain public
corporations as parts of government agencies whose subsidies can be
reduced or eliminated as matters of executive discretion.2 3 But such
15. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 66.40(9)(m) (reserve and sinking funds) and q 66.40(9)(i) (1965)
(hold property); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7002 (general reserve fund), § 6407 (McKinney
1961) (hold property); 16 U.S.C. § 831c( f (1970) (treasury and hold property).
16. Wise. STAT. ANN. § 66.40(5) (non-partisan and determine own qualifications and
compensation for employees) and § 66.40(8) (1965) (removal for cause after formal hear.
ing); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6415 (McKinney 1961) (shall fix own qualifications and
duties for employees), and Goldstein, An Authority in Action-An Account of the Port
of New York Authority and Its Recent Activities, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 715, 717
(1961) (non-partisan board and removal for cause); 16 U.S.C. § 831e (1970) (non.partisan),
§ 831b (1970) (no civil service requirement), and § 831c(0 (1970) (removal by concurrent
resolution of Congress).
17. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 64.40(4) (creation) and § 66.40(5) (1965) (appointed by munici-
pal government); N.Y. UNcoNSOL. LAWS § 6403 (creation) and § 6405 (McKinney 1961)
(appointment of Commissioners half by New York State and half by New Jersey State);
16 U.S.C. § 831 (creation) and § 831a (1970) (appointed by President with advice and
consent of Senate).
18. Wise. STAT. ANN. § 66.40(21) (federal financing), § 66.404(2) (municipal financial
assistance) and § 66.40(13) (1965) (issue bonds); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6416 (appro-
priations for expenses) and § 6459 (McKinney 1961) (issue bonds); 16 U.S.C. § 831z (ap-
propriations authorized) and § 831n (1970) (issue bonds).
19. Wise. STAT. ANN. 66.404(1) (payments in lieu of taxes) and § 66.40(23) (1965) (an.
nual reports to municipality); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6971 (payments in lieu of taxes)
and § 6408 (McKinney 1961) (annual report to state legislature); 16 U.S.C. § 8311 (1970)
(payment in lieu of taxes and annual report to Congress).
20. See generally G. CUNEO, GOVERNMENT CONTRArs HANDBOOK (1962).
21. Unless the shifting of funds violates a mandatory duty. Work v. United States
ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175 (1925).
22. For example, the legal constraints on the Post Office, a newly created public
corporation, are set by the rate levels approved by Congress. Since these rate levels are
too low to generate a yearly profit, the Post Office must receive financial assistance of
some kind from the government. See generally 39 U.S.C. § 101-5605 (1970).
23. See, e.g., argument by government on the cross-claim, Brief for HUD, Barber v.
White, Civ. Action 15,235 (D. Conn., filed Jan. 26, 1973), maintaining that HUD has
almost total discretion over operating subsidies to LHA's.
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treatment undercuts one of the key legislative purposes of these cor-
porations-the promotion of business efficiency through decentralized
decision-making.24 When the provision of adequate subsidies becomes
uncertain, public corporations cannot rationally plan existing pro-
grams or embark on innovative ones.25 Moreover, a high risk of non-
payment is likely to induce private suppliers to increase their charges
for goods and services. The legislature could, of course, eliminate
public housing or any program carried out by a public corporation.
It could also transform public corporations into parts of a govern-
ment agency. But so long as these programs are retained within their
current legal framework, the task is to structure a system for pro-
viding operating subsidies that will allow public corporations to reap
the benefits of decentralized decision-making while at the same time
maintaining some accountability to the government.
This article will examine the fiscal problems of LHA's as a case
study in the financing of public corporations. The legislative and
executive roots of the fiscal crisis now facing LHA's will be explored.
The barriers to resolving this crisis through administrative laws will
then be considered. Finally, a contract approach, supplemented by
a funding formula, will be suggested for dealing with the financial
problems of public corporations.
I. Federal Roots of the Fiscal Crisis
The advantages of decentralized decision-making for LHA's have
been severely undercut by the uncertainties of government funding.
Congress only gradually faced up to the fiscal implications of its sub-
stantive legislation on public housing. The Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) moved even more slowly in making
full use of congressional authorization. When HUD finally began
to push for adequate operating subsidies, it was blocked by the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB).
A. Legislative Irresponsibility
To improve the plight of the low-income residents of public hous-
ing, Congress in 1969 limited tenant rentals to twenty-five percent of
24. The House committee report on the TVA, for example, stated: "We intend that
the corporation shall have much of the essential freedom and elasticity of a private
business corporation." H.R. REP. No. 130, 73d Cong.. 1st Sess. 19 (1933). Similarly, a
New York State Commission said that the quasi-public corporation form would "pro-
vide a more flexible administrative instrument to manage commercial type public enter-
prises," quoted in Abel, supra note 10, at 190.
25. For instance, tenant counseling services may now be included in the computation
of operating costs by LHA's. HUD Circular HM 7475.9, Feb. 10. 1972. However, if
LHA's cannot be assured of receiving operating subsidies, they will not embark on
tenant counseling.
1211
The Yale Law Journal
tenant income.2 6 In 1970 Congress further reduced the rents of LHA
residents by defining more stringently the income base to be used in
calculating the twenty-five percent limitation on tenant rentals. '
In 1971 Congress finished the legislative trilogy by making clear that
welfare recipients were to be covered by the twenty-five percent rule.'-",
To help compensate LHA's for the mandated rent reductions Con-
gress authorized the payment of operating subsidies in HUD's annual
contributions to LHA's in 1969 and in 1970.29 It also authorized the
amendment of the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) between
HUD and every LHA:30
(1) to assure the low-rent character of the projects involved, and
(2) to achieve and maintain adequate operating and maintenance
services and reserve funds including payment of outstanding debts.
Although the attempt to reduce the rental burden of public hous-
ing tenants may have been laudable, the legislators failed to cope
with the fiscal implications of their statutory reforms. First, the au-
thorized funds for operating subsidies were originally insufficient to
meet the extra cost imposed by the twenty-five percent limitation
on tenant rentals.31 In fiscal year 1972, for example, the authorized
funds earmarked for operating subsidies totaled $185 million, as com-
pared to the estimated loss in LHA revenues of $200 million caused
by the three Brooke Amendments. 32 Only in the middle of fiscal
year 1973 did Congress increase the statutory maximum for annual
contributions earmarked for operating subsidies to a level above ac-
tual revenue lost under the three Brooke Amendments.3 3
26. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 § 213(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970)
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp I, 1971).
27. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 § 208(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970)
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. I, 1971).
28. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1971 § 9, 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. 1,
1971).
29. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 § 212(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1410(e) (1970),
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1410(e) (Supp. 1973).
For a history of earmarked authorizations, see App. infra.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970). The ACC's are standard contracts signed by both
parties before any projects are started and contract amendments are added for every
new project.
31. For example, the LHA of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, has an annual deficit of
$400,000 in excess of operating subsidies, caused in large part by average reductions in
rent from $43 per month to $22 per month since the Brooke Amendments. King, Cities
Losing on Aid for Housing Poor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1972, at 17, cols. 2-3.
32. For the $185 million authorization, see App. infra. For the $200 million estimate
on the Brooke Amendments, see speech by Secretary of HUD, George Romney, Annual
Convention of the Mortgage Bankers of America [hereinafter cited as Romney speech),
quoted in Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 34, NAHRO v. Romney, Civ. Action No. 2080-72 (D.D.C., filed
Dec. 19, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Points).
33. Pub. L. No. 92-503. 86 Stat. 906. amending 42 U.S.C. § 1410(e) (1970) (codified at
U.S.C.A. § 1410(e) (Supp. 1973)). See App. infra, especially -col. (4) in Chart.
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Second, the funds authorized for operating expenses were geared
only to the extra costs imposed by the Brooke Amendments. But LHA
and HUD officials had warned Congress that local housing projects
were rapidly becoming insolvent before the passage of the Brooke
Amendments. 34 Two independent studies of LHA's showed that op-
erating costs between 1965 and 1968 had risen by 6.9 percent per
annum, mainly as a result of inflation.35 Revenues of LHA's had not
kept pace with these rises in operating costs despite large increases
in rental charges. For example, from 1952 to 1967 rents of the New
York City Housing Authority increased by 71.6 percent, but operating
costs rose by 125.6 percent.36
Third, Congress deferred to the limited funding requests of HUD3a
rather than exercising its power to appropriate all the money au-
thorized for operating subsidies. 38 Thus, despite an authorization of
$185 million toward the operating expenses of public housing in
fiscal year 1971, Congress appropriated only $108 million.3°
B. Administrative Recalcitrance
While implementing the Brooke Amendments40 and other costly
modifications in standard LHA leases,41 HUD officials resisted pay-
ment of operating subsidies to LHA's .A2 In 1969, Congress authorized
an additional $75 million "to cover the amount by which the appro-
priate rental charges exceed 25 percent of the income of the tenant
and to cover the cost of adequate operating and maintenance serv-
ices . . . ."43 Yet in 1969 HUD did not ask for any appropriations
34. Walsh, Is Public Housing Needed for a Fiscal Crisis?, 26 J. oF HOUSING 64 (1969);
see also Romney speech, supra note 32.
35. See F. DE LEEUw, OPERATING COSTS IN PUBLIC HOUSIxn: A FINANCIAL CRIsiS 12. 27
(1970) and R. RYDELL, FACTORS AFFECrNG MAINTENANCE AND OrERATrNc CosTs IN FEDRAL
PUBLIC HOuSING PROJECTS 17 (1970).
36. Walsh, supra note 34.
37. See p. 1214 infra. Compare col. (5) with col. (6) in Chart of App. infra.
38. Prior to passage of an appropriation by the Appropriations Committee, an
authorization must be approved by the committee with substantive jurisdiction and
passed by Congress. In the housing field, the authorizing committee is the Banking and
Currency Committee.
39. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973-APPNDMX 511 (1972). See
cols. (4) and (8) for fiscal 1971 in Chart of App. infra.
40. See, e.g., HUD Circular RHM 7465.19, Apr. 24. 1970.
41. See HUD Circular, RHM 7465.6, Aug. 10, 1970. This HUD circular eliminated
from LHA leases many clauses such as confession of judgment, waiver of legal notice.
and waiver of jury trial. Later HUD prohibited tenant surcharges for excessive use of
utilities in projects with master meters. HUD Circular, RHM 7465.7, Feb. 1, 1971. Also.
the courts now require an adversary-type hearing before LHA tenants can be evicted.
which imposes another set of expenses on LHA's. See Escalera v. Housing Authority, 425
F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
42. See Romney speech, supra note 32.
43. H.R. REP. No. 91-740, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1969). Congress also indicated dis-
approval of HUD's traditional limitation of annual contributions to operating subsidies
by passing an amendment in 1969 which made clear that annual contributions should
"not [be] limited to debt service requirements .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1410(b) (1970).
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from this additional authorization. When Congress authorized the in-
clusion of operating costs in the ACC's during the 1970 legislative
session, the Conference Report criticized HUD for inaction on op-
erating subsidies to LHA's.4 4 But HUD declined to amend the rele-
vant sections of the ACC's.
Even after fiscal 1971, when HUD did seek appropriations to cover
operating subsidies out of the additional authorizations, the requests
were often below the sums that had been authorized.45 There is little
doubt that the Committee would have deferred to higher requests
on the basis of HUD's expertise.40 In fiscal 1972 the Committee re-
quested that HUD submit a supplemental estimate on operating sub-
sidies because the sum asked for was so obviously inadequate.47 HUD
did not comply with the request.
To provide more operating subsidies without expending more
money on public housing, HUD finally shifted funds from other as-
pects of public housing, like new construction, to operating subsi-
dies.48 But the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) opposed
shifting funds49 in sufficient amounts to-fill the gap between the ear-
marked appropriation for operating subsidies and the aggregate oper-
ating deficit of LHA's.50 As a result, HUD was forced to reduce op-
erating subsidies to levels substantially beneath the deficits incurred
by individual LHA's during fiscal years 1972 and 1973."'
44. H.R. REP. No. 91-1784, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1970).
45. Compare col. (4) with col. (5) in Chart of App. infra.
46. Compare col. (5) with col. (6) in Chart of App. infra. The Budget for fiscal year
1973 stated as to authorizations for public housing:
This authority, under the legislation, is available for use without specific appropria-
tion action although the budget program is subject to Congressional review.
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973-APPENDix 489 (1972). The historic
deference of the Appropriations Committee to HUD requests on public housinF was
reaffirmed by congressional officials. Telephone interview with Mr. Maurice Pujol of
the Senate Committee on Appropriations (Jan. 5, 1973), and telephone interview with
Mr. Alex Hewes of the Senate Committee on Banking, Currency, and Urban Affairs
(Jan. 6, 1973).
47. S. REP. No. 820, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972).
48. On October 6, 1972, HUD announced that $100 million more than the actual
appropriations would be spent on operating subsidies. HUD Secretary Romney Adds 100
Million Dollars to Operating Subsidy Funds for Public Housing, NAHRO Bulletin, Oct.
13, 1972. For other reallocations, see App. infra.
49. [F]unds sufficient to have met LHA's demands for fiscal 1972 . . . have been
held back in the amount of 44 million dollars by OMB.
NAHRO Takes Action to Save Homes for Million Low Income and Elderly Families,
NAHRO Bulletin, Aug. 9, 1972 [hereinafter cited as NAHRO Takes Action].
[T]he office of Management, which must authorize all Federal Expenditures, has
refused to release all of the subsidies the local authorities contended they were
due under the Brooke Amendment.
King, Cities Lose on Aid for Housing Poor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1972, at 1, col. 5 & at 17,
col. 2.
50. Compare col. (8) with col. (9) in Chart of App. inIra.
51. For example, HUD failed to provide $290.000 claimed by the housing authority of
Tulsa, Oklahoma, for fiscal 1972. Response to Public Housing Operating Subsidies Crisis
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One key legal weapon employed by HUD to curtail operating sub-
sidies was § 1410(b), which limited "fixed annual contributions" to
the yearly yield at a specified interest rate on development cost.52
After the National Association of Housing & Redevelopment Officials
(NAHRO) filed suit against applying the § 1410(b) limitation to
operating subsidies, 53 Congress repealed the section by a joint reso-
lution in 1973.5. However, HUD with the help of OMB then pro-
mulgated new funding procedures,i 5 still pegged to annual contri-
butions as computed under § 1410(b). "
II. Local Response Through Administrative Law
To offset their deficits, LHA's have used up reserves, ceased main-
tenance of units, and raised rentals of tenants. "T As the effectiveness
of these stop-gap measures has been exhausted, they have attempted
to obtain injunctions in the nature of mandamus ordering HUD to
provide more operating subsidies for LHA's. s Tenants, meanwhile,
have brought suits against LHA's for statutory violations.50 The legal
measures taken by LHA's as well as the countermeasures taken by
tenants have proceeded on theories of administrative law. The net
Grows as Administrative Position Hardens, NAHRO Bulletin, Oct. 6, 1972. There
have also been reports of uncompensated operating deficits for LHA's of $2 million in
Boston; $5 million in Chicago; $3 million in Baltimore, Mar)land; $1.5 million in
Buffalo, New York; $3.5 million in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. King, Cities Lose
on Aid for Housing Poor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1972, at 17, cols. 2-3.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(b) (1970).
53. Complaint at 22-3, NAHRO v. Romney, No. 2080-72 (D.D.C., filed OcL 16, 1972).
NAHRO maintained that HUD could provide operating subsidies which varied from
year to year, above the "fixed annual contribution" of § 1410(b) geared to construction
subsidies.
54. Before the court could decide on NAHRO's argument, Congress eliminated the
§ 1410(b) limitation by a joint resolution. Pub. L. No. 92-503, § 3(2). 86 Stat. 906.
amending 42 U.S.C. § 1410(b) (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1410(b) (Supp. 1973)).
55. Subsidies for Operations: Low-Rent Public Housing Program, HUD Circular
HM 7475.12, Nov. 28, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Subsidies for Operations].
56. See generally New Public Housing Operating Subsidy Formula, 2 Law Project
Bulletin #2, at 6-11, Dec. 15, 1972 (mimeograph).
The new uniform funding procedures contravene the prime purpose behind the con-
gressional joint resolution. The "uniform" funding scheme is pegged to project budgets
for the last half of fiscal 1971 and the first part of fiscal 1972. HUD Circular H.M.
7475.12, 3(a)(1)(a), Nov. 28, 1972. Since the § 1410(b) limitation was in effect during
these two fiscal years, HUD has implicitly continued a statutory provision ovemled by
Congress. The continued reliance on this statutory provision is justified by HUD
on the entirely unsupported assertion that "Departmental assurance was given that the
elimination of this restriction would be utilized only in cases where the Housing Author-
Ity is faced with a severe financial emergency." Id. at 5(a).
57. NAHRO Takes Action, supra note 49. Also, LHA's have deferred payments in
lieu of taxes, allowed vacancies to occur, stopped utility payments and sold equipment.
Id.
58. See Memorandum of Points, supra note 32.
59. See, e.g., Boynes v. Marsh, No. 570 (E.D. Mich., filed May 5, 1972).
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result of these cases is that tenants can enforce statutory obligations
on LHA's, but LHA's cannot require the government to provide
adequate financing.
A. Tenants vs. LHA's
Attempts by LHA's to "ignore [the] Brooke Amendments" 0 were
barred in Barber v. White,"1 the only tenant-LHA litigation reported
thus far.0 2 In Barber, the New Haven Housing Authority (NHHA)
admitted that its rents exceeded the twenty-five percent statutory
ceiling but argued that the limit, absent federal reimbursement,
amounted to a taking of property without due process of law."0 Dis-
trict Court Judge Newman rejected this NHHA argument:0 4
The unappealing but blunt fact is that nothing in the Act nor
any judgment of this Court enforcing the Act requires the NHHA
to continue in operation ... as long as the NHHA is operating
with federal funds and pursuant to federal law, the provisions of
federal law will be strictly enforced.
Judge Newman correctly reasoned that although the rents charged
welfare recipients by the NHHA were set according to state law,"0
the Supremacy Clause requires state law to be subordinated to federal
requirements." It the federal requirements are too onerous, then
NHHA can simply go out of business.0 After all, states may effec-
60. NAHRO Takes Action, supra note 49.
61. Barber v. White, Memorandum of Decision on Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Civil Action No. 15,235 (D. Conn., filed Nov. 28, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum of Decision]. This decision is summarized in 41 U.S.L.W. 2301-02 (Dec.
12, 1972).
62. See also Okinello v. Alaska State Housing Authority, No. A-13372-Civ. (D. Alas.,
filed Aug. 18, 1972).
63. See Memorandum of Decision, supra note 61. To support this argument, NHHA
relied on cases which protected railroads from federal and state orders requiring con-
tinued operation at a loss on the grounds of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
See, e.g., Railroad Comm. v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79 (1924) and In re New York,
New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 304 F. Supp. 793, 801 (D. Conn. 1969). See also
Note, Takings and the Public Interest in Railroad Reorganization, 82 YALE L.J. 1001
(1973). This argument was made by LHA's in other cases. See, e.g., Cuyahoga Metro-
politan Housing Authority v. HUD, No. C72-1208 (N.D. Ohio, filed Nov. 7, 1972).
64. Memorandum of Decision, supra note 61, at 11.
65. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 8-48 (1958).
66. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968). Moreover, this type of state law, which
sets higher/ rents for welfare recipients than for other public housing residents, has
been invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause by other courts without reference
to the Brooke Amendments. See Luna v. Housing Authority, No. 969, 666 (L.A. Super. Ct.
July 7, 1970); and Hammond v. Housing Authority and Urban Renewal Agency, Civil
No. 70-264 (D. Ore., Apr. 2, 1971). See generally Note, Higher Rents for Welfare Re.
cipients in Public Housing: An Analysis Under the Equal Protection Clause, 45 S. CAL.
L. REv. 263 (1972).
67. In contrast to Judge Newman's position on this point is the reasoning of the
district court judge in the unreported decision of Fletcher v. Housing Authority. Memo.
randum Opinion Order and Judgment, Civ. Act. No. 7399-g (W.D. Ky., filed March 9,
1216
The Financing of Local Housing Authorities
tively bar public housing by failing to pass enabling legislation, and
city governments may refuse to take advantage of state enabling legis-
lation. 8 While the liquidation of a housing project would normally
require that the bondholders be compensated, the federal government
has always guaranteed by statute the annual payment of these LHA
bonds regardless of the project's fiscal status.69
B. LHA's v. HUD
Recently, NAHRO requested an injunction in the nature of man-
damus compelling HUD to make up all the operating deficits of
LHA's30 The crux of NAHRO's argument is that HUD has a minis-
terial, i.e., non-discretionary, duty to draw upon the unspent authori-
zations of past fiscal years. 7 ' According to the recent holding of a U.S.
district court7 2 however, the statutory framework "does not command
1973) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum Opinion Order and Judgment). The court
in Fletcher found that the financial problems of the LHA justified the exclusion of
prospective tenants from vacant units solely because their incomes were too low.
If Fletcher is interpreted broadly to permit the exclusion of all very poor tenants
from public housing, it may be criticized for flaunting legislative history, statutory
language, and judicial precedent. The legislative history shows that public housing
was intended to "take care of the poorest first," 81 Co.NG. Rac. 8098 (1937), and "to
give preference to families with the most urgent housing needs." S. REP. No. 84. 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1949). The statute now requires that preference for admission to
public housing be given by criteria not necessarily related to income. 42 U.S.C. §
1410(g)(2) (1970). Moreover, this discrimination against the very poor runs counter to
judicial precedent in Thomas v. Housing Authority, 288 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
In that case, the court held that the exclusion of all unwed mothers from public hous-
ing violated the Equal Protection Clause because this category is not rationally related
to the main purpose of providing safe and sanitary housing for low-income families.
Id. at 579.
If Fletcher is interpreted more narrowly-in light of legislative history, statutory lan-
guage, and judicial precedent as discussed above-it should mean that LHA's can
promulgate admission policies geared to achieving a more even income distribution of
tenants, but only within very strict boundaries. Such admission policies must be limited
to tenants within the income range statutorily defined for public housing, they cannot
categorically exclude tenants on criteria such as race or welfare recipiency, and they can-
not violate the legislative preferences for admission which are often unrelated to in-
come. Under this narrow interpretation of Fletcher, LHA's would not be able to use
admission policies to increase rental revenues by a sufficient amount to offset operating
costs. For example, the "rent range" admission policy used by the LHA in Fletcher
increased rental revenues by only R25,000 for a year in which the authority asked for
over one million dollars in operating subsidies. ,Memorandum Opinion Order and
Judgment, supra, at 6.
68. See Note, Government Housing Assistance to the Poor, 76 YLE UJ. 503, 509
(1967).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(e) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1410(e) (Supp. 1973).
70. Memorandum of Points, supra note 32.
71. NAHRO's argument is premised on HUD's duty to provide safe and sanitary
units in public housing. Although HUD normally has discretion in carrying out this
duty, there is only one method to resolve the current fiscal crisis-the provision of the
maximum sums allowable under § 1410(e) for operating subsidies. Memorandum of
Points, supra note 32, at 12-26.
72. Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum Opin-
ion, NAHRO v. Romney, Civ. Act. No. 2080-72 (D.D.C., filed March 2, 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Order and Memorandum Opinion].
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HUD to spend or commit all of the contract authority available for
a given year." 73 Moreover, the idea of drawing upon authorizations
from past fiscal years violates the annual basis for public housing
finance. 74
Even if NAHRO could persuade a court that the general au-
thorization for public housing was in effect a specific appropriation
for operating subsidies, NAHRO would still face two major legal
barriers to success. First, there would be the issue of whether an
agency must spend the full amount of its appropriations.T And sec-
ond, NAHRO would have to persuade a judge that the suit was not
a disguised attempt to claim money damages from the government. 0
III. A Contract Approach to Financing Public Housing
Stymied in seeking to pass increasing costs to tenants or to extract
funds from HUD, the LHA's might profitably launch litigation based
on a contract theory of HUD-LHA agreements. Agreements with the
government for a current or past fiscal year should be treated as bind-
ing contract obligations. And to set the level of future subsidies, a
funding formula should be established either by Congress or by HUD
and NAHRO through collective bargaining.
A. Contracts Between LHA's and HUD
LHA's are more like private firms contracting with the federal gov-
ernment than administrative agencies within the federal bureaucracy.
Congress originally designed LHA's as independent corporations
chartered by states and financed by private bondholders. 77 Congress
73. Id. at 4.
74. The statute is written in terms of maximum sums on an annual basis. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1410(e) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1410(e) (Supp. 1973). Congress appropriates
money for public housing annually, and HUD approves LHA budgets each year.
75. For a discussion of the current impounding controversy, see Court Battle Over
President's Impounding of Highway Aid Joined by 20 Congressmen, Wall St. Journal,
Jan. 3, 1973, at 5, col. 5, and Complaint, City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, Civ. Act. No.
2466-72 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 12, 1972).
76. At least one federal district court has dismissed such a mandamus suit to compel
the release of HUD funds on the grounds that it challenged sovereign immunity and
should be properly decided by the Court of Claims. Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F.
Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
77. The original decision to establish LHA's
was prompted by local resentment against the federal Public Works Administration
and by a Sixth Circuit decision that slum clearance and construction of low.rent
housing were not a legitimate public purpose for the federal exercise of eminent
domain. The independent authority form, typified by an unpaid board of commis.
sioners appointed by the mayor, was chosen to insulate the program from "politics"
and municipal corruption and to avoid municipal debt limitations. The federal
Public Housing Administration (PHA) acts only at the summons of local officials.
Note, supra note 68, at 509.
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stressed their "local autonomy" in a 1959 amendment."8 A federal
district court recently recognized that the LHA-HUD relationship was
contractual rather than administrative by viewing each LHA as "an
independent entity which contracts (as a principal) with both the
State and Federal Governments.""0
Under the express contracts (ACC's) signed with HUD,80 that Depart-
ment agrees to provide certain kinds of financial assistance to LHA's
if they agree to follow elaborate sets of operational guidelines.,, Since
HUD began paying operating as well as construction subsidies in 1969,
the Department has worked through circulars8 2 which have been ac-
corded the legally binding effect of explicit clauses in the ACC's. 3
These circulars set forth specific guidelines for LHA's in preparing
annual budgets and calculating operating subsidies necessary for the
coming fiscal year. Within HUD, area and regional officials approved
these budgets, and their signatures should be regarded as incur-
ring binding obligations to pay operating subsidies included in the
budgets.8 4
78. Housing Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, 73 Stat. 679 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1401 (1970). Congress emphasized the autonomy of LHA's in its reports on the housing
bills of 1949 and 1961. See S. REP. No. 84, 1949 US. CODE Co.o. SEMvIcE 1551. 1566; and
Hearings on S. 1478 Before tie Subcommittee on Housing of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 229 (1961).
79. Housing Authority v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1027, 1033 (1972). The court made
this statement in response to an argument that LHA's should not be allowed to sue the
government because they were effectively "arms" of the state.
80. The latest version of this ACC is HUD 53011, Nov., 1969.
81. See, e.g., the detailed provisions on construction subsidies, ACC ' 401-17.
82. In granting substantial sums in operating subsidies, HUD has reied on Forward
Funding of Subsidies for Operations: Interim Instructions and Procedures, HM 7475.8.
Jan. 27, 1972. This circular was recently replaced in large part by Subsidies for Opera-
tions: Low-Rent Public Housing Program, HM 7475.12, Nov. 28, 1972. When HUD
granted special family subsidies for operating expenses, it employed the procedures set
out in the Low-RazNr HousIc FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (No. 7475.12, June.
1969).
83. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969). and Housing Authority
v. United States Housing Authority, Nos. 72-1102 and 72-1185 (8th Cir., filed Sept. 28,
1972). These circulars are considered supplements to the ACC's. Lefcoe, HUD's Author-
ity to Mandate Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, 80 YAL.E L.J. 463. 467 (1971). Stch
legally binding circulars have been implicitly incorporated into other types of relevant
government contracts. G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States. 312 F.2d 418 (1963).
84. For example, at the end of the current circular, Subsidies for Operations. supra
note 82, there is a space for the signatures of the review officer of the area office and
the accountant of the regional office. These signatures go below a sum which is marked
"Amount of Subsidies for Operations prevalidated and approved for payment." These
signatures may be regarded as constituting a binding commitment to the designated sum
for operating subsidies. InterviEw with Mr. John Shaw, Chief of the Financial Manage-
ment Branch, Program Services Division, HUD Office of Housing Management (Mar. ,0,
1973). The two latest circulars, Subsidies for Operations and Forward-Funding, supra
note 82, were intended to provide LHA's with definite assurances of the designated level
of operating subsidy before the start of the fiscal year, id., in contrast to the prior s)s-
tern of discretionary reimbursement of operating deficits at the end of the fiscal year as
contained in Low-RENr HOusING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT HANDMOOK (No. 7475.12, June,
1969).
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Moreover, HUD proposed an amendment to the ACC's in 1972
requiring LHA's to submit estimates of the "additional annual con-
tributions" needed to make up operating deficits.85 If these estimates
are approved by HUD area and regional officials, such approval
should similarly be regarded as creating binding contracts. HUD was
empowered by Congress to make such contract amendments for oper-
ating subsidies.80 The contracts say: "The faith of the United States
is solemnly pledged to the payment of all annual contributions con-
tracted for . . ." and such contract obligations shall be paid "out of
any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated."
8 17
B. Breach of Contract
If operating subsidies designated in approved budgets have not been
paid in full, LHA's should be able to obtain contract damages against
HUD in the Court of Claims.88 Several defenses are available to HUD:
the government's sovereign immunity, the absence of authority of
HUD agents, or the lack of consideration for the operating subsidies.
But LHA's may exploit well-recognized exceptions to these defenses.
1. Sovereign Immunity
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the government may
be sued in contract only if it has consented to be sued." But in the
Tucker Act, the United States consented to be sued for claims
"founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or
any regulations of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States ... ."00 Thus, LHA's can sue
on the ACC's as an express contract with the United States, or on a
85. See, e.g., Amendment No. 35 proposed by HUD to ACC No. NY-414 of the New
Haven Housing Authority.
86. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 § 210, amending 42 U.S.C. §
1410(a) (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970)).
87. ACC § 423.
88. Several leading cases hold that when the Government enters into a contract, it
incurs binding obligations just as a private party does. See Perry v. United States, 294
U.S. 330, 352 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
Some LHA's have included a contract claim in their complaint against HUD. See
Complaint, Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. HUD, No. 298-72-N
(E.D. Va., filed June 15, 1972). Public housing tenants have also raised contract claims
against LHA's and HUD in Okinello v. Alaska State Housing Authority, No. A-43372-CIv.
(D. Alas., filed Aug. 18, 1972). But tenants in their contract claims against HUD on the
ACC's may not be able to obtain standing as third party beneficiaries because ACC § 510
specifically excludes suits by third-party beneficiaries.
89. Maricopa County v. Valley National Bank, 318 U.S. 357 (1943); United States v.
Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970).
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claim founded upon § 1410(e) guaranteeing the "payment of all an-
nual contributions contracted for pursuant to this section."0 1
The most serious problem posed by sovereign immunity for the
success of contract claims by LHA's against HUD is the notion of a
protected sovereign act, as announced in the Horowitz case:02
It has long been held by the Court of Claims that the United
States when sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an
obstruction to the performance of the particular contract resulting
from its public and general acts as a sovereign.
The Horowitz rule has been severely criticized. 3 But regardless of
the rule, LHA's could fit within at least two well-established ex-
ceptions. First, since the alleged sovereign act was carried out by HUD,
the same agency which made the contract, then HUD cannot hide
behind its own act under the sovereignty doctrine.04 Second, the fail-
ure of Congress to appropriate enough money for LHA operating sub-
sidies is not a protected sovereign act if the contract was made accord-
ing to proper contract procedures. 3
2. Actual and Apparent Authority
HUD could also argue against contract claims on grounds that HUD
area and regional agents had no actual authority to bind the Depart-
ment as principal to the ACC's. To be sure, HUD agents, despite
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(e) (1970). See National Bank of Newark v. United States, 357 F.2d
704 (Ct. C. 1966).
92. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 460 (1925).
93. The fact that the Government, by its own actions can escape contractual lia-
bility simply because of the abstract concept of sovereignty offends all sense of
equity and fair play.J. McBRIDE & I. IVACHTEL, I GovzarN. t"r Cohr'mars § 3.10, at 3-4 (1969). For an in-
cisive critique of impairment of contract by the federal government, see Calabresi,
Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes, 71 YALE LJ. 1191 (1962.
94. See, e.g., Beuttas v. United States, 11 Ct. Cl. 532 (1943), where the Court of
Claims distinguished the Horowitz line of cases, saying.
[I]n all of those cases the contracting officer had nothing whatsoever to do with the
act complained of, while in the present case it was the very department of the
Government that entered into the contracts with plaintiffs ....
Id. at 537.
95. See J. MCBRIDE & I. WAHcth , IV GovR ENTrr CO.ntACrS § 31.60(2). at 31-47 (1969).
For example, in Seatrain v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 272 (1943), a private firm agreed
to construct two vessels of a certain type in exchange for a contract from the Postmaster
General to carry the mail. But Congress passed a proviso to the appropriations of the
Post Office Department which said no part of the appropriations should be paid on the
contract with this firm. Nevertheless, the court held for the private contractor, saying-
When Congress delegates to an agency of the Government the right to enter into a
contract under certain terms and conditions, and these terms and conditions are
fully carried out and a contract is entered into, it becomes a valid, binding agreement
of the Government and such valid contract is protected by the Fifth Amendment and
cannot be taken away without making just compensation.
Id. at 315.
1221
The Yale Law Journal
their authority to make binding financial commitments to individual
LHA's, had no authority to promise operating subsidies, which in the
aggregate exceeded the total annual appropriations eligible for operat-
ing subsidies."6 But, while HUD agents may have lacked actual author-
ity, they clearly manifested apparent authority by signing ACC's and
approving LHA budgets.9"
If HUD were a private party, it would be estopped from arguing
that the sums involved in contracts exceeded appropriated funds, and
the LHA's would recover approved operating deficits to the extent
that they were actually incurred. Apparent authority is not generally
applicable against the government. 98 But the Supreme Court has spe-
cifically held in favor of contractors in cases where authorized govern.
ment agents have contracted for aggregate sums exceeding the relevant
congressional appropriation, because:
persons contracting with the Government for partial service under
general appropriations are not bound to know the condition of
the appropriation account at the Treasury as on the contract
book of the Department."
3. Failure of Consideration
Finally, HUD could argue that LHA's gave no consideration for
HUD's commitment to operating subsidies. 00 But this defense should
be invalidated because the consideration in the ACC's is a mutual
promise to perform certain acts for the direct benefit of the govern-
ment-acts which impose serious financial constraints on local housing
authorities.' 0 ' Doubts as to the existence of adequate consideration
96. In reply to NAHRO's claims that certain LHA's are due more money for operating
subsidies, HUD has maintained in part that it has already allocated all eligible funds for
public housing. Affidavit of Nathaniel J. Eiseman, Director of HUD Office of Budget,
NAHRO v. Romney, Civ. Act. No. 2080-72 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 6, 1973).
97. See generally Mcintire, Authority of Government Contracting Officers: Estoppel
and Apparent Authority, 25 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 162 (1957).
98. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). This opinion has becen
severely criticized. See, e.g., Whelan & Dunigan, Government Contracts: Apparent Author.
ity and Estoppel, 55 GEO. L. REV. 830, 847-49 (1967).
99. Myerle, Ex'r v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 1, 25 (1897). A later court followed the
Myerle rule in Schuler & McDonald v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 631, 643 (1937); cf. Karlio.
Smith Co. v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 110 (1936).
100. J. McBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, I GOVERNMENT CONTR. CTS . 1.50 (1969).
101. In the ACC's, the LHA's agree to follow certain housing policies set by HUD. The
ACC says: "The Local Authority shall at all times maintain the low-rent character of each
of the Projects." ACC § 202. It also says: "The Local Authority shall at all times maintain
each Project in good repair, order, and condition." ACC § 209. Some provisions of the
ACC's are more related to general governmental goals than HUD's housing policy. LHA's
must buy supplies only from American firms. ACC § 303. LHA's "shall take affirmative
action" to promote racial, religious, and sexual equality in employment. ACC § 301.
The Local Authorities must "pay to the Government a reasonable fixed fee for providing
representatives of the Government at the site of each Project in connection with the
construction thereof." ACC § 122.
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should be resolved against HUD since the ACC's are standard con-
tracts drafted by the Department.102
Even if a court should decide that LHA's have provided no con-
sideration, LHA's could still obtain damages by promissory estoppel,
under which courts have granted reliance damages on conditional
promises of a gift or grant.103 When HUD approves budgets of LHA's,
it should reasonably foresee that LHA's will rely on them in incurring
obligations to private businessmen, leases with tenants, and commit-
ments of rent subsidies to private landlords under the leased units
program. 104
C. Renegotiation of Contracts
A contract approach to HUD-LHA agreements, though it might win
damages for breach of contracts for past years, does not provide an
adequate solution for future LHA financial problems. Were courts
to adopt a contract theory, HUD might well refuse approval of annual
LHA budgets until Congress granted the Department's appropriations.
In its appropriations requests, HUD could simply seek an amount
substantially less than the aggregate sum needed to cover operating
subsidies. If tradition holds, the Congressional Appropriations Com-
mittees, despite their receptivity to funding requests for operating sub-
sidies, would defer to HUD's expertise.205 With this low appropria-
tion, HUD would then compel LHA's to reduce their operating sub-
sidy requests before the Department would sign their budgets. 10 0 The
LHA-HUD agreements would thus be contractually binding, but
effectively inadequate.
A long-term solution requires a restructuring of HUD-LHA re-
lationships to provide for a funding formula as the basis for yearly
LHA allocations. The formula, incorporated in all ACC's, would not
only be legally binding against HUD, but also would guide the Appro-
priations Committee in evaluating the sufficiency of HUD funding
requests. It would facilitate more rational planning on the part of
both LHA's and HUD, by enabling longer-range projection of spend-
102. Standard government contracts should be interpreted against the drafter. 1 J. Me.
B.mE, GovERNiENT CoNTrAcrs CoMMENTrATOR § 2.10[6] (Rel. No. 97, 1973).
103. See Ricketts, Ex'r v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
104. For example, the LHA in Alameda, California, tried to turnback to HUD the
-leases on 240 leased units because its operating deficit was $60,000 per )ear on these
units, and HUD was providing only $37,000 per year in operating subsidies. King, Cities
Lose on Aid for Housing Poor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1972, at 17, cols. 2-3.
105. See p. 1214 supra.
106. Because of HUD's inadequate request for appropriations in fiscal 1972 and 1973.
the department attempted to reduce operating subsidies in the budgets of many LHA's.
See Complaint at 16, NAHRO v. Romney, No. 2080-72 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 16, 1972).
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ing and revenue needs. In a larger sense, it would promote more pre-
cise assessments of the quality of public housing to be made available,
the costs and the benefits.
The funding formula would be based on a realistic appraisal of the
factors influencing the income and revenue of LHA's. These factors
would include the rent levels under the Brooke Amendments, the
impact of inflation on operating expenses, the cost of qualifying proj-
ects under the housing code, and the need for LHA's to maintain
operating reserves. Such a formula would differ significantly from
the current funding circular 07 and contract amendment proposed by
HUD,' 0 8 which are based on a project maximum repealed by Con-
gress'0 9 as well as an arbitrary cost estimate imposed on HUD by
OMB. 10 Courts should provide the impetus for a realistic funding
formula by invalidating the current HUD circular on operating sub-
sidies, as requested by LHA's in two pending cases.""
Two methods would be available to establish a new formula for
operating subsidies. LHA's could arrive at a formula through collective
bargaining with HUD. Alternatively, Congress could impose a legis-
lative formula on all parties. Under either approach, the formula
would be legally binding. While LHA's would continue to submit
yearly requests for operating subsidies to area and regional offices of
107. See Subsidies for Operations, supra note 55.
108. See note 85 supra.
109. See note 56 supra.
110. The current HUD circular for computing operating subsidies is arbitrary for
two reasons. First, by basing all calculations on fiscal year 1971, the circular locks LHA's
into the level of operating expenses which they fortuitously incurred during that particu.
lar fiscal year. Second, the current HUD circular says that operating costs should be
increased by three percent per year from the baseline of fiscal 1971. Subsidies for Opera-
tions, supra note 55, at 3a(l). But independent surveys showed that in tile latter half
of the 1960's operating costs rose annually by almost seven percent, mainly due to in-
flation. See p. 1213 supra. HUD itself estimates an average rise in operating costs of over
four percent per year between 1970 and 1973. Interview with Mr. Robert Gair, HUD
Office of Budget (March 20, 1973).
I11. Supplement to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, NAHRO v. Romney, Civ. Act. No. 2080-72 (D.D.C.,
filed Jan. 2, 1973); and Memorandum of Law of Defendants Housing Authority of the
City of New Haven, Edward White, Jr., and Dominic Panagrossi in Support of their
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Response to the Motion of Federal De-
fendant for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment,
Barber v. White, Civ. Act. No. 15, 235 (D. Conn., filed March 5, 1973).
There is ample judicial support for invalidating such circulars. Administrative cir-
culars by HUD have recently been struck down because they flaunted legislative intent
on other housing programs, Davis v. Romney, 41 U.S.L.W. 2446 (E.D. Pa., Feb. 13, 1973).
As to the arbitrary cost figures, the judge said in denying a preliminary injunction to
NAHRO on its mandamus claim:
The statute gives HUD considerable discretion in allocating subsidy [sic] to the
local housing authorities. HUD, of course, cannot exercise this discretion In an
arbitrary or unreasonable way . . . . In an appropriate case, a District Court might
order HUD to re-examine the amount of subsidy allocated to a local housing
authority.
Order and Memorandum Opinion, supra note 72, at 4.
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HUD, the only debatable issue would be whether the formula had
been applied properly to a specific project.
Collective bargaining seems the most likely method in view of the
existing practice."12 Recent negotiations between individual LHA's
and HUD have led to some settlements of disputes about operating
subsidies."13 In these negotiations, HUD's bargaining power has been
partially balanced by threats of bankruptcy from LHA's,114 fear of
destructive violence by public housing tenants,"9 , and political pres-
sure from influential congressional figures. 1 0 However, these indi-
vidual negotiations have left out relevant parties such as public hous-
ing tenants;"x7 they have taken on the appearance of covert lobbying
rather than legitimate bargaining; and, most importantly, they have
accorded HUD a significant advantage against LHA's, which may be
played off against each other in the piecemeal allocation of money.1 8
A formal system of collective bargaining would enable tenants of
public housing projects to participate in negotiations through the
National Tenants Union, as courts have permitted program benefici-
aries to do in the welfare field.'1 9 Negotiations would be all-inclusive
and highly visible: Attention of all interested citizens and government
officials, not merely of the LHA administrators and their clientele,
could be focused on the issue at a particular time. 2 0 Most crucially,
LHA's would be a far more formidable bargaining force against HUD
112. At least one LHA has already suggested collective bargaining between LHA's
and HUD to arrive at a new formula for computing operating subsidies. Letter from
Edward White, Jr., Executive Director of New Haven Housing Authority, to Mr. Lawrence
L. Thompson, Area Director, HUD, Jan. 31, 1973.
113. For example, the New York Housing Authority reached an agreement with HUD
on operating subsidies after "long negotiations." 25,000 Welfare Families in Projects Get
Rent Cuts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1973, at 44, col. 3.
114. For example, after the LHA in St. Louis announced that all projects would go
into federal receivership, HUD gave the LHA needed operating subsidies. 4 NAHRO
Letter 3, Dec. 18, 1972 (No. 50).
If a LHA goes bankrupt, the federal government must continue to pay off the con.
struction bonds. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(e) (1970). Historically, projects taken over by the federal
government have performed poorly. Lefcoe, supra note 83, at 468. However, these projects
cannot be easily liquidated since there are few willing purchasers.
115. Bad housing conditions were cited as one of the major causes of the urban
riots in the late 1960's. REPORT or THE NA TIOAL ADvISoRY CoMMIstssIoN ON CIVIL Dis-
olDEas 81 (1970).
116. NAHRO Takes Action, supra note 49.
117. Tenants are relevant parties to such negotiations if only because they can play
an important role in reducing maintenance costs. See Note, Tenant Unions: Collecthe
Bargaining and the Low-Income Tenant, 77 YALE L.J. 1368, 1375 (1968).
118. Under the present system, the larger and more politically influential LHA's haic
a strong incentive to demand their operating subsidies before HUD claims that all
eligible funds have been given to other housing authorities. HUD is better able to play
LHA's off against each other because LHA's operate on four different fiscal years.
119. See National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (1970).
120. For a discussion of the legitimizing effect of open, formal bargaining in the
prison context, see Note, Bargaining in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Re-
lation between the Inmate and the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, 746 (1971).
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by presenting a united front through NAHRO, as indicated by the
success of other similar groups in collective bargaining with HUD.121
If, on the other hand, Congress chose to establish a formula for
LHA's and HUD, congressional calculations could be based on hear-
ings and investigations conducted by the Banking and Currency Com-
mittees. Congress could then pass a legislative formula for operating
subsidies similar to the one for revenue sharing, delineating the fac-
tors to be considered and their relative weighting. The formula could
be reviewed each year by Congress, and modifications could be made
to take into account changes in the public housing program.
Conclusion
Contract theories might be applied to the financing of other public
corporations similar to LHA's. For them, as for LHA's, theories of
administrative law reinforce the statutory rights of program benefici-
aries without requiring adequate government subsidies to finance
these statutory rights. Under a funding formula approach, the proper
level of government subsidies could be determined by Congress or
through negotiations between the corporation and the relevant gov-
ernment agency. Once Congress passed the appropriations mandated
by the funding formula, public corporations would have claims based
on contract or statute against the government for these operating sub-
sidies. Such an approach would provide public corporations with the
financial security needed to benefit from decentralized management,
while guaranteeing the government an opportunity to review their
activities.
121. Tenant unions won significant improvements in standard lease forms through
collective bargaining. See Lefcoe, supra note 83, at 463.
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